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The struggle between taxpayers and spenders in local 
government brings out the best and the worst in us. It 
forces us to .balance our fiscal capacity against our sense 
of responsibility for meeting ·the needs of the schools, the 
highways, and the town general fund. It is by no means a 
routine or even a very pleasant experience for most voters, 
but it is the essential exercise of direct democracy that 
still gratefully separates Vermont from the majority of states 
in the Union. Voting on budgets is the fuel that fired the 
strongest passions of Vermont municipalities. 
We gather together in rooms to decide how much we should 
spend, as a community, on services we provide to all residents. 
We vote on the purchase of a new grader or a backhoe, on whether 
to give money to the Visiting Nurses, on how much the town . 
officials should be paid, on the school budget. We vote these 
propositions, knowing that our property taxes will increase or 
decrease depending on how we exercise our legal discretion to 
set expenditure limits for the town and town school district. 
Each year we have a choice. Each year we have the right to 
say yes or no •. 
The basis for local taxation in Ve~ont is the appraised 
value of real and personal property. Property was once the 
principal source of revenue for state and local government, 
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but in recapt years we have begun to lose confidence in its 
ability to support even the needs of towns and school districts, 
and we have turned to federal and state income tax sources for 
reinforcement. Still, we must vote to appropriate any monies, 
before they may be expended, from whatever source they emanate. 
It is the voting at a duly warned town meeting--th~s very 
populist process we have invented in Vermont--that is the 
subject of the following article. 
Voting means making choices. If only one municipality 
were involved, we might make these choices with more facility, 
but there are two different municipalities, towns and school 
districts, with different warnings, different budgets, and 
usually different meetings, involved here. There are also two 
different legislative bodies, the selectmen and the school . 
board, who are responsible for proposing, defending, and 
overseeing the expenditures of these budgets. One might 
even argue that there are two different electorates in many 
cases, depending on who turns out at each meeting and who 
votes for the two budgets. 
The authors have set as the objective of their study 
some understanding of the relationship between town and 
school district budgets. They have used statistical 
summaries of 243 Vermont towns and school district budgets 
for three consecutive years. They have looked at the results 
of budget votes through the cold, dispassionate tube of a 
computer and have drawn conclusions from numbers about how 
voters make their choices. 
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The provocative question is how discretionary budgets 
really are today. How much freedom do taxpayers have to 
decide how much to appropriate each year for local government? 
can they afford to ignore state standards on schools and risk 
the loss of state aid? Can they afford to appropriate less 
than $50.00 a mile for town highway maintenance and risk the 
loss of highway aid? Can they ignore contract negotiations 
with teachers and unionized employees, health and safety codes, 
federal regulations on handicapped access, and the prevailing 
rate of inflation? 
What matters most to selectmen and school directors is 
the bottom line. Sworn to maintain good roads and provide a 
suitable education for the children of the municipality, these 
worthy officials will not feel they have met their responsi-
bilities if they do not act as strong advocates for sound 
budgets designed to fund the services they must provide. 
Taxpayers, strapped by tax burdens already heavier than they 
can bear, may not share the legislative body's ideas on what 
constitutes a sound budget. So the process of finding an 
amount agreeable to both groups often takes on an air of 
adversariness that resembles a military encounter. 
We have seen the advent of the September budget in school 
districts that have failed to adopt a suitable budget in 
elections held in every month since March. ~ve have seen 
meetings last until the early hours of the morning before a 
budget is voted. We have seen petitions submitted to remove 
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selectmen and school board members who have offended voters by 
conscious deficit spending. We have seen passion and courage 
and subterfuge and disorder at the polls. 
This study by authors Tashman and Munson will not cool 
those passions or make the passage of suitable budgets in 
towns ·and school districts any easier, but it is a valuable 
contribution to the literature en Vermont local government. 
It confirms my suspicions that discretion in local budget 
votes is more myth than reality. ~ve adopt budgets . according 
to the size and income of the population, in relatively uniform 
patterns. 
Local government in Vermont is a fertile area of 
investigation for students and scholars. The budgetary 
process itself holds the ·key to the dynamics that drive 
communities to new thresholds of voter involvement in 
public affairs. Tashman and Munson have opened the frontier. 
Paul S. GiUies 
Vermont Deputy 
Secretary of State 
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In Vermont, as in all other states, the voting of 
local taxes is a perennial political issue. Each year 
residents of Vermont municipalities vote to approve budgets 
for school services as •:Tell as for non-school (i.e., tmvn} 
services for the coming fiscal year. The results of these 
votes establish the local school and town tax rates that in 
turn determine the tax bill for which each property owner 
becomes liable. ~~ile the bottom line is the total amount 
of tax each resident \'Jill be asked to pay, there are inter-
esting questions concerning the vJay in vJhich tax dollars are 
divided between the school and non-school functions. 
The most basic question is vJhether voter decisions to 
commit local taxes for one budget are influenced at all by 
the local-tax implications of the other budget. Alternatively 
stated, do voters attempt to achieve a balance between 
school-tax and to\om-tax commitments? In principle there are 
three types of behaviors possible: 
1. Independence: School and town budgets are 
evaluated entirely on their individual 
merits--no relationship exists between the 
level of taxes committed to support the school 
budget and the level of taxes approved for town 
services., 
2. Competition~ School and town budgets are 
evaluated as alternative uses of the local tax 
dollar--a trade off (or inverse relationship} 
exists betvJeen school and tovm tax commitments: 
3. Complementarity~ School and tax budgets are 
evaluated as joint municipal services, to be 
funded more or less generously in unison--a 
positive (or direct} relationship exists between 
school- and tovJn-tax commitments. 
; -2- . 
The form of voter behavior--independence, competition, 
or complementarity--has implications for local government 
planning and coordination. For example, do local officials 
increase the risk of voter disapproval of a proposed increment 
in the school budget if they recommend substantial increases 
in the town budget, as well? The form of relationship 
betvJeen school- and town-tax decisions can also shape a 
municipalityvs response to the receipt of state and federal 
aid. Will state aid to education monies, for example, be 
utiiized entirely to (a) increase local school expenditure 
or (b) reduce local school taxes and indirectly increase 
local funding of town services? 
In an attempt to determine relationships between school 
taxes and town taxes, "itle have compiled data for 2 43 of Vermont's 
local jurisdictions for three years: l979g 1980, and 1981. 
For each locality '~.-le have created three-year averages of 
school taxes assessed and of tmvn taxes assessed, with both 
measures expressed on a per household basis. Ne then 
correlated hm'l7 voter tax commitments to the school and town 
budgets relate to the size of the community, the wealth of 
the community, and to each other. 
Our results, while not always unambiguous, suggest t\tlO 
principal conclusions~ 
1. Cownunity wealth and commu~ity size influence 
voter choices between the school and to~'l7n 
budgets in opposite . directions. Holding 
~~ealth constant, larger communities tend to 
allocate a greater share of local tax revenue 
to the town budget than do smaller communities. 
Holding size constant, richer co~nunities tend 
to allocate a greater share of local revenues 
for the school budget than do poorer communities. 
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2. The dominant form of relationship between 
school- and town-tax commitments is com-
plementarity, that is, localities that 
allocate above-average levels of taxes to 
the school budget also tend to allocate 
above-average levels of taxes to the town 
budget. There is little or no evidence from 
Vermont data that voters view the school and 
tm-1n programs as competing uses of the local 
tax dollar. 
Part 1 presents the arguments that underlie hypotheses of 
competition and complementarity in voter choice and reports 
some empirical evidence from prior studies. Part 2 describes 
and compares the levels of school- and town-tax assessments 
among the 243 Vermont jurisdictions. Two hypotheses that 
emerge from this examination of the Vermont data are analyzed 
in parts 3 and 4. Finally in part 5 we assess the deficiencies 
1 
of our analyses and present our plans for further research. 
P}~T I. Competition or Complementarity in 
Voter Cho~ces 
The hypothesis of competition between school and non~school 
claims on the municipal tax base is based upon t·lrlO assumptions • 
First, it assumes that voters are a1rmre of the tax implications 
of their votes on the local budgets. Such ar.vareness is probably 
a plausible assumption in the context of the town meeting tra-
dition in Vermont, especially since the municipal tax base in 
Vermont localities is the highly stable and predictable 
property base. 2 It is not necessarily a plausible assumption 
in states that lack a tradition of local control or in states 
that permit localities to levy non-property taxes. 
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Second, the hypothesis assumes that there is a limit to 
the overall local tax burd~n voters are ~lilling to bear in a 
particular fiscal year. The limit may have a political 
origin--a tax rate ceiling, _ ~or example--or an economic 
origin--a fixed proportion of income that voters are willing 
to allocate for municipal services. 
Under these assumptions, it can be argued that school 
and town services must compete for a share of the aggregate 
property tax dollar. If voters find they must commit .relatively 
large sums toward uncontrollable expenses in one budget, they 
will be reluctant to support discretionary outlays ~Tithin the 
other budget. The necessity to authorize a substantial in-
crease in tax revenues for road maintenance, for example, may 
impinge on voter willingness to endorse any increment in school 
taxes during the same year. 
In her 1975 article in the National Tax Journal, Helen Ladd 
offers a similar statement of the competition hypothesis. 
Potentially, the provision of non-educational 
public services specifically to business firms could 
induce a reduction in residents' demand for educa-
tion services. This is based on the view that the 
public provision of business reduces the income 
available to residents to be spent on all 3other goods and services, including public education. 
Ladd found "no evidence to support the hypothesis of a negative 
impact on education expenditures of high non-school expenditures" 
. -4 from her data analyses. 
-5-
Nor did a study by Seymour Sacks, et al., find any evidence 
of competition between school and non- school claims on the 
municipal tax base. Results based on a national cross-section 
of ninety-five central cities led Sacks to conclude that 
"cities that have high (per capita) taxes in one domain also 
have high taxes in the other ... s 
Both the Ladd and Sacks studies suggest that any inter-
dependence beb.veen the school and tmvn budget levels is 
probably 111'."1eak" and reflects not competition but complementarity 
(Sacks used the term "reinforcement") in voter choice. 
A c:::>mplementari ty hypothesis can be asserted on t\'110 distinct 
grounds. First, the residents of a municipality may have "voted 
by foot" for a community in -v1hich individuals have tastes for a 
mix of public and private goods similar to their own. Such 
homogeneous collections of voters may prefer high levels of 
public services (and taxes) in both domains of the municipal 
budget. This is to say that good schools, as v!ell as good 
roads and recreational facilities, may well be complementary 
demands. 
In addition, commlli~ity zoning and subdivision regulations 
may be promulgated to achieve a balance between residential 
property and commercial/industrial development. Voters may 
believe that expansion of the community's commercial/industrial 
base will reduce or at least slow the rate of increase in 
required school tax rates. If so, their allocation of tax 
revenues to the town budget may be viewed as a vote toward 
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improvement of the community's infrastructure and, in turn, an 
investment toward attraction of neti commerce and industry. 
Hence, higher town-tax levies during a fiscal year may be 
voted precisely because the school tax levy is high. 
In summary, the relationship between school and town 
claims on the municipal revenue base can be driven both by 
competitive and by complementary forces. It is conceivable 
that the empirical findings of little or no correlation between 
school and town taxes reflect the net result or cancellation 
of competitive and complementary thrusts. The findings also 
are consistent with a hypothesis of independence in voter 
choices between school and town taxes. Still another explanation, 
however, emerges from our review of the Vermont data in the 
next section. 
PART II. School and Town Revenues in Vermont 
Commun~t~es ~ Background Analys~s 
Prerequisite to an . analysis of relationships between school 
and town revenues are several basic questions about the behavior 
of Vermont communities. In this section \ve tv-ill report ne\"J 
information about~ 
1. Local (property) tax revenues assessed in support 
of the school budget. 
2. Local (property) tax revenues assessed in support 
of the town tudget. 
3. The relative shares of school . and town tax revenues. 
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Annual data on local taxes by tm,m are published in the 
Annual Report of the Vermont Division of Property Valuation 
and Revie'I.V' (DPVR) • These data show taxes assessed for schools 
as well as total local taxes assessed. Hence, taxes assessed 
for the town budget can be derived by subtracting the school 
component from the total. At the time of this study, the 
latest available year of data was 1981. 
Utilizing the DPVR annual figures, we have compiled a 
three-year average (1979-1981) of each community's school 
ta:x: and tm•m tax assessments. Any single year's data will 
reflect the many special circumstances that influence a 
community's budgetary decisions during a particular fiscal 
year. A three-year average "smooths '; the annual data and, 
accordingly, should be more indicative of the community's under-
lying preferences for municipal services. 
J!l oreover u in order to make meaningful inter-community 
comparisons, the data measuring total dollars of taxes assessed 
must be expressed on a per-unit basis, ti1at is, they must be 
scaled for differences in community size. To accomplish tl1is, 
ta:x: dollars can be expressed on a per-capita basis (Sacks), on 
a per-pupil basis (Ladd) or upon a per-household basis. ~'Ve 
have chosen the last-named. The behavior we are investigating 
involves three key actors : decision-making units (voters), 
paying units (property taxpayers), and consuming units (families). 
The best composite of the three is the household. 
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The best available data for the number of households in 
a community is the number of d\tlelling units ( 19 80 census) • 
Accordingly, we describe the behavior of Vermont communities 
on the basis of the three variables: 
S: School taxes assessed per household, 1979-1981 
average 
T~ To'lfm taxes assessed per household, 1979-1981 
average 
P: The school share (proportiog> of total local taxes 
assessed, 1979-1981 average 
We were able to determine values for S, T, and P for 243 
of Vermont's 251 taxing jurisdictions. Eight communities were 
7 
omitted due to missing data in the DPVR Annual Reports. We 
now present a description of these results. 
Char·t 1 is a frequency distribution of variable S, the 
three-year average of school taxes assessed per household. 
Sho-vm are the number and percentage of communities \t-Jithin 
each i t class interval." The first class interval v for example, 
represents communities in t;Jhich the level of school taxes 
lies between $100 and $200 per household. 
The median level of S is $560 and the (unweighted) mean 
is $613. So the "average" Vermont community is assessing 
about $600 a year in school taxes per household. 8 The middle 
50 percent of the communities--when arranged in order of s--
raises between $400 and $800 per household, an interval that 
can be vie't'l7ed as defining a 11 norrnal 11 range of school taxation. 
Chart 1 also reveals that there is considerable variation 
about the norm. Annual average school taxes per household 
·t< 
... . . 
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CHART l 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF VERMONT TOWNS 
* BY LEVEL OF SCHOOL TAXES ASSESSED PER HOUSEHOLD (S) 
-· . 
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of Administration, S t ate of Vennont; housing unit s a nd median household 
income are from the 1980 Census; the multiyear averages, r atios , and 
statistics were compiled by the authors. 
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are as low as $132 (in tJinhall) and as high as $1,896 (Essex 
. ) 9 Junct~on • 
Chart 2 provides the frequency distribution of the 
variable T, the three-year average of town taxes assessed 
per household. The median T is $230, the mean is $253, and 
normal range is $170 to $290 per household. Hence, Vermont 
communities tend to assess almost $2.50 of revenue for the 
school budget for each $1.00 assessment for town services 
(Hedian S = $560, r'ledian T = $230). Across the state, T ranged 
from a low of $26 (Bloomfield) to a high of $686 (Brattleboro} . 
Information on the school share of total local revenues 
(P) is shown in chart 3. Both the mean and median are equal 
to 0.71. So, on the average, 71 percent of local property 
taxes were assessed for the school budget, 29 percent for town 
services. In the vast majority of co~~unities, the school 
share fell between 60 and 80 percent. Richford was at the 
bottom of this distribution with a school share of 35 percent 
and Bloomfield was at the top ,.7ith a school share of 95 percent. 
In table 1 we report simple (pain1ise) correlation 
coefficients ~~ong the four variables S, T, P , and H, where 
H denotes the number of households in a community (i.e., 
community size) • vJe call your attention to bro of these 
correlation coefficients. 
The correlation between S and T, r(S, T) , is +0. 46 4, \'lhicll 
is a statistically significant but only moderately positive 
1 t . 10 corre a ~on. Th'Ll'; corre ~at-.ion cuggcst-s that. in tho::;o Vermont 
$0 
ll 
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CH Al{'l' 3 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBliTION OF VERMONT TOHNS 
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tm.-Jns where school taxes per dvJelling are above average, tmm 
taxes per dwelling also tend to be abova average. On the 
surface, this result supports a hypothesis of complementarity 
in voter preference for municipal services and is consistent 
with Sacks's findings in his analysis of ninety-five central 
cities across the country. 
The correlation between P and H, r(P,H), is -0.244, a 
lm:l but statistically significant negative correlation. The 
result suggests a tendency for the school share of local 
revenues (P) to decline--and hence, the town share to 
increase--as community size increases. This finding is 
provocative. 
Perhaps L~e relationship (form of interdependence) between 
school and town tax revenues differs between smaller and 
larger communities. Neither the Ladd nor the Sacks study 
incorpora·ted community size as an explanatory variable, both 
assuming (implicitly) that correlations between S and T will 
not be affected by coll\ffiuni ty size. It is possible, therefore, 
ti1at an analysis which explicitly distinguishes size-classes 
of communities may reveal information about the rela·tionship 
betvJeen S and T that would be "blurred" by correlations cal-
culated for the aggregate of all communitiesv small and large. 
Evidence to this effect comes from a recent study by one 
of the authors based on the eighteen towns in Chittenden 
11 County, Vermont. Munson detected that the larger towns 
tended at once to have the highest town services budget (per 
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household) and the lowest school budget (per household) . He 
speculated that this result reflected the effect of community 
size on the kinds of tm·m services provided. For example, 
Burlington, the larges'c cormnunity in the stuc1y, provides its 
residents and businesses with a relatively full array of 
services, including police and fire protection, parks and 
recreation, sanitation and sewage 1 and road maintenance 
(street repair and snm1 removal) . Bolton, the second smallest 
corrununity in the county, devotes most of its tovm budget to 
but one function~ road maintenance. 
Recent data for Chittenden County are swnmarized in 
table 2. * The tmvns are listed from smallest to largest based 
on the number of housing units in 1980. The column labeled 
"Road Haintenance %11 is the percentage of each CO!Th.llunity us 
to~m-service budget devoted to non-school expenditures . 
~·Jhat we find is thatg in the smaller communities (feHer than 
1,500 housing units) 1 road maintenance absorbs a r.najority of 
the tm'ITn budget (52-66 percent) ~1hile in the larger commw1ities 
(more than 1,500 housing units), road maintenance is allocated 
a minority ( lJ- 42 percent) of the tmm budget. At least in 
Chittenden County, growth in size induces a broadening of the 
array of tm"ln services provided. 
*Under 1.deal cond1.t1.ons these data ~Jould describe expenditures 
for all Vermont municipalities. Unfortunately, the only source 
of expenditure data is individual town reports, and these do 
not follow a uniform format. The only tabulated expenditure 




Percentage of 1981 Non-School Expenditures Allocated to Road 
Maintenance in Chittenden County 
(Municipalities arrayed by number of housing units in 1980) 
(N = 18) 
Housing Units Road Maintenance 
St. George 241 15.81 
Bolton 359 64.9 
Huntingtcn 448 63.5 
~vest ford 468 53.6 
Underhill 751 52.5 
Hinesburg 1.,025 58.1 
Charlotte 1,043 66.92 
Richmond 1,071 60.3 
Jericho 1,078 60.6 
Williston 1,204 57.6 
Shelburne 1, 719 24.5 
Essex Town 2,279 24.7 
Milton 2,321 41.7 
Winooski 2,403 18.8 
Essex Jet. 2,547 33.4 
s. Burlington 3,972 19.4 
Colchester 4,566 21.13 
Burlington 13,767 19 0 7 
% 
1 St. George has 5. 65 miles of public roads and no public buildings. 
2Richmond data are for 1980. 
3Expenditures on solid waste disposal are included in street 
department expenditures. 
Source: Data taken from 11 Economic and Miscellaneous Data Report: 
1982, 11 Chittenden County Regional Planning Commission. 
Compiled as part of the commission's ongoing study of 
local municipal finances by Michael J. Munson in 1983. 
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Road maintenance is a distinctive cat.egory i n the to·•n 
budget. In any fiscal year there is a minimum level that 
must be expended, whi ch depends upon 1>Jeather and street condi-
tions. Hothing generates citizen complaints faster than 
unplowed or impassable roads. But beyond the level required 
for adequate conveyance of vehicles, there is little incre-
mental benefit to additional road maintenance expenditures. 
Munson describes the road E1a.intenanc e function, therefore , 
as c:. relatively non-discretionar~ h u clget cor.ll>onent . In COI;1-
~Jarison to most other typ es of tmvn service s, required outlays 
for roaQ. maintenance arc p rescribcu by concH tions external to 
t he local econcmy; hence, the road l.Uaintenance !Judget should 
~e r e lat.ively insensitive to budgetarlr rcq uir2ments for otl1~ r 
tmm se rvic:=s. 
'l'his argu~nent p rovi des a potential e xp lv.nation for t ile 
evidence that P, the sc~1ool s hare of locE~.l tax revenues ~ 
te:qds ·to decline as H v conu.nuni-t:y s i ze? increases. \lith grouth 
in size as ~o Je proceed from smaller to larger , coanuni ties 
·tend to com:.::1it increasing amounts of tax r e venue tmJarcl a 
:.:;roadening of the set of to~·m s ervices offered., in a ddition 
to maintaining their relatively non- discretionary support f or 
rou.cl Itlaintenance. Thus, tax rev0 nues for tmvn services \!Jill 
rise as community si ze expancls. Since sch ool r e venues pe r 
d 11 . b 1' 1 1 . , . . t . 1 2 ::Je 1.n0 ear J.tt e or no re at1.onsn1.n to comrnunl. y s1.ze , 
tll...:: e ffec·t of grmJth in s ize (other thing s being equal) is 
co r educe the school share of local revenu8s. 
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PART III. The Effects of Size and tJealth 
The correlation evidence presented in part 2 affords at 
best an impression of the relationship between community size 
and local tax choices. A more formal investigation of these 
relationships would require that other determinants of local 
tax choices be held constant. For example, voter choices 
between school and town services may be influenced by variables 
such as (1) the number of public school children per household, 
(2) housing density (number of households per square mile 
of land area), (3) the mix of property valuation between 
residential and "business" property, and (4) the wealth of the 
municipal voters. Of these, the last--comunity wealth--is 
certainly the most critical factor. In an affluent community, 
voters can finance both good schools and good municipal 
services at reasonable tax rates; a poor community, in 
contrast, cannot acquire much of either, except at burdensome 
tax rates. 
Positive relationships between local school spending and 
local wealth have been documented by numerous studies covering 
virtually every state in the nation. In fact, it has been 
the intent of both federal a~d state court decisions to 
mitigate, if not eliminate, the '\Ileal th dependence of the 
financing of education in local communities. 
In Vermont, as well as in other states which employ an 
"equalizing formula" for distribution of state and local 
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school districtsr there is an additional reason to expect a 
positive (direct) relationship between school taxes and wealth. 
Not only does school expenditure tend to increase with 
wealth, but since state aid is distributed in inverse relation 
to wealth, the local tax share of school spending increases 
as wealth increases. Alternatively stated, the wealthier 
the community, the larger the share of each dollar of the 
school budget that must be financed from local revenues. 
Hence, it is reasonable to posit that local school-tax 
decisions are closely wealth-dependent {correlated with 
community-wealth) while local town-tax decisions are less 
wealth-dependent than they are size-dependent (correlated 
with community-size). More technically, we offer the 
following pair of hypotheses: 
Hypothesis (la) ~ If community size is held constant 
(i.e., if all communities had the same number of 
households) , then school tax revenues 'l.vill tend to 
increase as community ,.,.,eal th increases, both 
absolutely and as a proportion of total local 
revenues. In symbolic terms, as wealth {W) grmvs, 
holding size (H) constant, both S (school taxes) 
and P (school share of total local revenues) will 
increase. 
Hypothesis (lb): If community wealth is held constant, 
tax revenues assessed for town services will tend to 
increase as community size-rllereases, both absolutely 
and as a proportion of total local revenues. 
Symbolically, asH (size) increases, holding W 
(wealth) constant, T {town taxes) will rise and P 
(school share of total local revenues) will fall. 
Several different statistical methods can be used to 
test the validity of our hypotheses, including multiple 
regression and multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) • The 
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approach we have taken hereu while lacking the elegance of 
the multivariate techniques, is far simpler to understand . 
and provides, as it turns out, qualitatively similar results. 
We begin with measurements of the size and wealth of 
each community. Community-size, as previously noted, is 
measured by the number of households in a locality (1980 
Census) and denoted by H. 
Our measurement of community-wealth ( vJ) is designed to 
incorporate both the income and property components of the 
wealth of community households. For the income component , 
we use Median Household Income (1980 Census). The property 
component is derived from the 1980 equalized fair market 
value of residential property in a community (DPVR 1981 
13 Annual Report). Following a procedure by McMahon, we 
converted the property valuation data for each community into 
a flow of "property income." In essence , property income 
represents the annual interest income that can be derived 
by investing the equity value of residential property at 
current interest rates. 
Our community-wealth variable is the sum of median house-
hold income (1980) and "property income 11 per household (1980) . 
It can be interpreted as a community's average income from 
e arnings , transfer payments, and property. 
The next step involved the grouping~ of individual 
communities into size and wealth brackets . Four community-size 
brackets were defined: fewer than 400 households, 400-799 
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households, 800-1,999 households, and 2,000 or more house-
holds. Like'l.·lise, four community-wealth brackets were created: 
less than $13,500; $13,500-$15,999; $16,000-$18,499; and 
$18,500 and over. 
Within each community-size bracket, we determined the 
correlation coefficient bet\'7een community-wealth (W) and each 
of our three behavioral variables: S (school taxes), T 
(town taxes) , and P (school share of total local revenues) • 
These correlations, reported in table 4 (see p. 23) , show the 
relationship between tax behaviors and wealth, holding 
. t . 14 commun~ y-s1ze constant. 
In addition, within each community-wealth bracket, we 
calculated the correlation coefficients between community-size 
(H) and each of S, T, and P. These correlations, reported in 
table 4, relate .taxing behavior and community-size, with 
community-wealth held constant. 
The results reported in tables 3 and 4 enable us to 
assess hypotheses (la) and {lb). 
Hypothesis (la): If community size is held constant 
(i.e., if all communities had the same number of 
households) , then school tax revenues \-Jill tend to 
increase as community wealth increases, both absolutely 
and as a proportion of total local revenues. In 
symbolic terms, as wealth (W) grows, holding size (H) 
constant, both S (school taxes) and P (school share 
of local revenues) will increase. 
If (la) is sound, then we should expect that within 
each community-size bracket in table 3 there is: 
1. A positive correlation between W and s--suggesting 
that, as wealth increases, school tax revenues 
per household tend to increase as well. 
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TABLE 3 
Correlations with Community Wealth 
Correlation Coeff. 
between 





Lowest r that is 
significantly 
different from 











400 400-799 800-1999 
(r.=74) (n=84) (n=64) 
0.427 0.374 0.722 
0.253 0. 301 0.307 
0.054 0.083 0.241 
0.195 0.183 0.211 
0.277 0.255 0.299 
(No. of 
Households) 






Sources: Annual tax revenue and property valuation data are from 
Annual Reports (1980-82) of the Division of Property 
Valuation and Review (DPVR), Agency of Administration, 
State of Vermont; housing units and median household 
income are from the 1980 Census; the multiyear 
averages, ratios, and statistics were compiled by 
the authors. 
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. TABLE 4 
Correlations with Community Size 
correlation Coeff. 
between 
community Size (H) 
and= 
School Taxes (S) 
Town Taxes (T) 
School Share (P) 
Lowest r that 
i s significantly 
different from 
ze r o at().,= 0.10 
Least significant 
difference between 














-0.02 3 0.096 
0 . 467 0.394 











Sources: Annual tax revenue and property valuation data are 
from Annual Reports (1980-82) of the Division of 
Property Valuation and Review (DPVR) , Agency of 
Administration, State of Vermont; housing units and 
median household income are from the 1980 Census; 
the multiyear averages, ratios, and statistics were 
compiled by the authors. 
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2. A positive correlation beb;·Jeen ~·l and P--signifying 
that, as wealth increases, the school proportion 
of local tax revenues tends to increase as well. 
3. A higher (more positive) correlation between W 
and S than between ~v and T--implying that school 
tax revenues are more closely related to community-
wealth than are town tax revenues. 
Precisely these results, however, are found in only one 
of the four community-size brackets--2,000 households or more. 
Here the correlation coefficients r(vJ,S) and r(W,P) are quite 
high (0. 817 and 0.800, respectively) and readily exceed the 
minimum correlation required for statistical significance at 
the 10-percent level (shown as 0.378 in the last column, the 
next to the bottom row). Although Sis far more highly 
correlated with w than T is (0.817 vs. 0.194), it barely 
exceeds the 0.549 minimum difference for statistical signifi-
cance at the 10-percent level. 
Had this configuration of correlations emerged right 
across the community-size brackets, we would have dramatic 
confirmation of hypothesis (la). The remaining results, 
hm:1ever, are observably weaker: while ~qe do find significantly 
positive correlations between WandS, the correlations 
between W and P are not significantly above zero. 
Finally, we can observe that r(vJ ,S) is higher than r(W ,T) 
in all four community-size brackets--the difference between 
r (W ,S) and r (W ,T) being statistically significant at d...= .10 in 
the two largest size-brackets. Thus, there is moderate 
empirical support for the belief that school tax levels are 
significantly more wealth-related than are town tax levels. 
-25-
Hypothesis (lb): If community wealth is held constant , 
tax revenuesassessed for tmm services will tend to 
increase as community size increases , both absolutely 
and as a proportion of total local revenues. 
Symbolically, as H (size) increases, holding W 
(wealth) constant, T (tmm taxes) will rise and P 
(school share of total local revenues) will fall. 
If hypothesis (lb) is sound, then the coefficients in 
table 4 should reveal ~ 
1. Positive correlations between T and H. 
2. Negative correlations between H and P--because, as 
H increases, the town proportion of local revenues 
is expected to rise; hence, the school proportion 
(P) will falL 
3. Correlations for H and T that are higher than the 
analogous correlations for H and S. 
The results for each of the middle two wealth-brackets 
provide statistically significant support for hypothesis (lb) 
in all three respects. T is positively correlated '"ith H, P 
is negatively correlated with H, and r(H,T) is significantly 
higher than r(H,S). 
In the \'lealthiest communities (the last column), the 
correlations all have the hypothesized sign, but the only 
statistically significant result is the positive correlation 
for Hand T (0.430). The correlation for Hand Pis too low 
for significance even atCl=.lO, and r(H,T) does not exceed 
r(H,S) by a statistically significant amount,. Finally, in 
the \veal th-bracket representing the poorest~ town, nothing 
but "noise" (insignificant correlations) emerges. 
Overall, we consider the evidence from tables 3 and 4 
to be qualitatively supportive of hypothesis (1) , although the 
observed pattern of generally weak correlations is not conclusiv2. 
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Much more satisfactory is the evidence displayed in 
table 5, for the twenty-one communities containing at least 
2,000 households. These twenty-one communities, with a total 
of 82,587 households in 1980, accounted for 37 percent of all 
Vermont households that year. 
In table 5, the communities are listed in increasing 
order of community-wealth, from the poorest--st. Albans--to 
the wealthiest "urban" community--Essex Junction. Among this 
group, Swanton is the median in terms of community-wealth: 
therefore, we may refer to the ten towns following Swanton 
as the 11 relatively wealthy 11 corr.munities and the ten towns 
preceding Swanton as the "relatively poor 11 communities. 
Since we have isolated the "large 11 communi ties--those 
that can be expected to provide the fullest array of town 
services--we would expect that wealth differences should be 
associated principally with differences in school tax levels 
rather than town tax levels (hypothesis [la]). In turn, 
the school proportion of total local revenues (P) should be 
higher for the relatively wealthy (large) communities than 
for the relatively poor (~arge) communities. 
Support for this hypothesis from table 5 is overwhelming. 
1. Among the ten relatively poor towns, the school 
share (P) varies from 49.9 to 65.2 percent with 
a median of 56 percent. In seven of these ten 
communities, P is below 60 percent. Among the 
relatively wealthy towns, the .school share lies 
within the range, 60.8-84.7 percent, with a 













Comparisons bet\'leen Weal thy and Poor Urban Communities 
Community School Share School Taxes Town Taxes 
(Listed from low p s T MEDIANS 
to high in terms 
of community-wealth) 
1. St. Albans 58.0% $453 $329 
2. BRrre City 54.6 394 328 
3. · Ne.r1port 55.1 517 421 
4. WinoosRi 65.2 456 244 
5' Eurlington 56.8 572 435 p = 
6. Rockingham 52.3 669 609 s = 
7' Brattleboro 52.1 747 686 T = 
8. St. Johnsbury 64.0 562 316 
9. Bennington 64.7 628 342 
10 . Rutl and 49.9 499 500 
(Median: Swanton) 72.8 498 186 
11 . Hontpelier 60.8 719 463 
12 . Middlebury 68.9 877 397 
13 . Hartford 61.2 785 499 
14. Springfield 61.0 860 549 
15 . ~iilton 71.0 606 247 p = 
16. Barre Town 62.6 680 405 s = 
17. Colchester 74.1 637 223 T = 
18. Essex Town 68.1 1173 567 
19. South Burlington 73.9 1361 482 
20. Essex Junction 84.2 1869 349 
Sourc8s: Annual tax revenue and property valuation data are from 
Annual Reports (1980-£2) of the Division of Property 
Valuation and Review (DPVR), Agency of Administration, 
State of Vermont; housing units and median household 
income are from the 1980 Census, the multiyear averages, 








2. Town tax levels (T} do not differ very much 
between the relatively poor and the relatively 
tvealthy communi ties. As shown in table 6 (see 
p. 30}, the median T is $382 i~ the ten 
relatively poor towns, $434 in the ten 
relatively wealthy towns, a difference of less 
than 15 percent. In con~rast, the medianS 
($823} in the relatively wealthy towns is 
52 percent higher than the median S ($540} in 
the relatively poor tO't'l7ns. 
PART IV. Correlations between School and Town Taxes 
The analysis of the preceding section concerned the 
effects of community size and community wealth on the. levels 
and mix of school and town tax revenues. On balance, the 
results suggested the importance of community size as a 
factor influencing the taxing behaviors. In this section, 
we extend our previous results to investigate the form of 
r e lntionship between school and town tax levels and whether the 
form of relationship differs as a function of community size . 
Hypothesis ~: The form of relationship between school 
tax revenues per household (S) and town tax revenues 
per household (T) will change as community size in-
creases. Competition in voter choices is more likely 
to emerge among small communities than among large 
communities. Conversely, complementarity in voter 
choices has a higher probability of being detected 
within a class of large communities than within a 
class of small communities. 
The rationale for the second hypothesis requires a bit 
of additional explanation. As discussed previously, in the 
smaller communities in Chittenden County (table 2} town taxes 
are allocated largely for road maintenance, a relatively 
non-discretionary function. In those small jurisdictions 
that face a requirement to levy high tax rates for road 
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maintenance, voters can limit their total tax liability only 
by exercising discretion upon (i.e., restricting) the size 
of the school budget. 
In larger communities, voter choices must encompass a 
broader array of tmvn services in addition to public schooling. 
Hence, the necessity of high tax assessment for road maintenance 
may lead voters to fund other, more discretionary town services 
at a lower level. Competition then may be diffused among the 
components of the town budget and not manifest itself in the 
choice between tmvn and school services. 
Of course, differences in community size alone cannot 
be expected to explain all differences in voter preferences 
between school and to\'m services. The demographic composition 
of a community's voters as well as the locality's zoning and 
subdivision policies will affect the types of services demanded. 
Prope~ly controlling for these factors is difficult, if not 
impossible, to do statistically. Our expression of hypothesis 
2 recognizes this difficulty : It asserts implicitly that, 
abcve and beyond these other considerations, an increase in 
community size accentuates a tendency toward complementarity 
in voter choices, and conversely, a decrease in community size 
reinforces a tendency tmvard competition in voter choices. 
Shown in table 6 are correlations between S (school taxes) 
and T (town taxes) for each cc~unity-size bracket. Un-
qualified support for hypothesis 2 would require that the 
degree of correlation between S and T becomes increasingly 
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TABLE 6 
Correlation Coefficients for School Taxes (S) and Town Taxes (T) 
Community-Size 
Bracket 




2000 or more (n=21) 
Simple Correlation~ 
r(S,T) 










Sources: Annual tax revenue and property valuation data are from 
Annual Reports (1980-82) of the Division of Property 
Valuation and Review (DPVR) v Agency of Administration, 
State of Vermont: housing units and roedian household 
income are from the 1980 Census; the multiyear averages, 
ratios; and statistics were compiled by the authors. 
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positive (or decreasingly negative) as \>Je proceed from the 
smallest to the largest cormnunities . . 
Note that in each size-bracket we show a pair of 
correlation coefficients: a simple correlation coefficient, 
r(S,T) and a v;ealth-adjusted correlation coefficient, r(S,T/W). 
The latter is offered as added precaution that the comparisons 
across size-brackets are not confounded by differences in 
wealth. 
The patterns revealed by the simple and partial correlatious 
are quite similar. First, we observe that all correlation 
coefficients are positive. This result indicates that in 
general voters seem to express complementary demands for 
school and town services. Witi1in any community size-bracket 
in Vermcnt, towns that vote higher school taxes per household 
also tend to vote higher town taxes per household. While 
these results are qualitatively similar to the findings of 
Sacks, they provide somewhat stronger affirmation of comple-
mentarity in voter choice. Sacks ' s data represent a single 
fiscal year, \vhereas our data are a composite of three 
consecutive years. Sacks's data are aggregated over all 
community-sizes; ours are disaggregated by community-size 
brackets. 
We also can see from table 6 that r(S,T) appears to be 
substantially higher for communities with at least 2,000 
households than it is within the smaller size-brackets. 
Descriptively, this result is supportive of hypothesis 2, 
suggesting a stronger degree of complementarity in voter 
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choice within large communities than that which prevails 
within smaller communities. However, a statistical test 
of the differences in r(S,T) across size brackets shows that 
overall the differences are not statistically significant 
(Chi-Square, 0..= 0.10). Thus we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the form of relationship between S and T is 
independent of community-size: the greater degree of com-
plementarity observed for the largest communities could be 
due to chance • 
PART V. Qualifications and Extensions 
When the data fail to offer substantive and statistically 
significant support for a hypothesis, there are two types 
of possible explanations. First, the hypothesis itself may 
be overly simplistic or simply unsound. Second, the data may 
be inadequate for the test. In principle, before one 
dismisses the hypothesis, one should investigate possible 
deficiencies of the data base and research design. In this 
regard, the analyses we have reported scffer from at least 
two substantive shortcomings. 
First, our local-tax variables are too highly aggregated, 
distinguishing school taxes only from the aggregate of town 
taxes. Our hypotheses rest partly on the belief that the 
road maintenance component of town taxes is a relatively 
non-discretionary (wealth-insensitive) commitment. Accordingly, 
proper tests of the hypotheses require a further disaggregation 
of local town taxes between road maintenance and other 
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functions. While such an effort is in progress, it appears 
that only a minority of the Vermont communities report their 
annual tax assessments for road maintenance (to the DPVR) in 
a distinct line item. So data collection in this pursuit 
will be a challenging task. 
Second and as noted earlier, community size and community 
wealth are not the only variables that are relevant to an 
explanation of tax choices. In our further investigations, 
we \-lill incorporate data measuring the number of pupils per 
household in a community, the density of housing in a 
community, and the mix of property between residential and 
"business." Between-community variation in these variables 
should be statistically controlled when assessing the 
effects of differences in community size and wealth. Doing 
so will not necessarily lead to stronger support for our 
hypotheses; however, it will serve to diminish the risk that 
our analytical results are being confounded by the behavior 
of these factors. 
NOTES 
1. A data · appendix providing individual-town figures on the 
measures created for tl1e study is available from the authors 
on request. 
2. At town meeting time voters often are told the official 
estimate of the grand list for the upcoming fiscal year as 
well as estimates of federal and state funding for local 
programs. Hence, adoption of a local budget proposal is 
tantamount to approval of the property tax rate that will 
have to be assE:ssed. l\loreover, since each property o~mer is 
cognizant of the assessed (or · listed) value of his or her 
property, a tax rate can be translated readily into an 
estimate of the property owner's tax liability. 
3. Helen F. Ladd, "Local Education Expenditures, Fiscal 
Capacity, and the Composition of the Property Tax Base," 
National Tax Journal 28, no. 2 (June 1975) :152. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Seymour Sacks et al., "Competition between Local School 
and i.~on-school Functions for the Property Tax Base," in Property 
Taxation and the Finance of Education, ed. Richard W. Lindholm 
(Un~versity of W~sconsin Press, 1974), 176. 
6. For each s P = S + T a~d the three-year average is: 
(Pl979 + pl980 + pl981) 13 • 
7. The Annual Reports contain numerous omissions as well as 
occasionally erroneous figures. We corrected errors for 
approximately twenty jurisdictions, after consultation with 
town clerks. 
8 . The figure does not mean that the 11 average" household in 
a community is liable for $600 a year in school taxes. A 
portion of the taxes assessed in any community is paid by 
business establishments, open-land owners, and vacation home-
owners. We assume, however, that the "burden 11 of taxes 
assessed on all property, residential and other, is borne 
by the resident households. Support for this assumption is 
provided by Michael c. Lovell whose examination of Connecticut 
school districts suggests 11 that voters feel they carry much 
of the burden of the (property) tax on business property" 
(!;Spending for Education: The Exercise of Public Choice, 11 
Review of Economics and Statistics 60 [November 1978]:91). 
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9. Actual school expenditures per household are approximately 
40 percent higher on average and are less widely disparate 
than are school tax revenues per household. The excess of 
expenditure over local revenue reflects state and federal aid 
to local school districts. State aid (under the Miller 
Formula--in effect through FY1982) in general supplemented 
the revenues of the low-taxing towns to a greater extent than 
it supplemented the revenues of the high-taxing towns. 
10. Note that a correlation coefficient between any two 
variables must assume a value between -1.0 (perfect negative 
correlation) and +1.0 (perfect positive correlation). The 
value 0.0 indicates no (linear) correlation at all. Values 
above (approximately) 0.120 are significantly different from 
zero at the 1 percent level of significance (George W. Snedecor 
and William G. Cockran, Statistical Hethods, 7th ed. [Ames: 
Iowa State University Press, 1980], table a-ll, p. 477). 
11. Michael J. lVlunson, "Residential Property Tax Burden in 
Chittenden County" (Mimeo, December 19 81) • 
12. From table 1, the correlation r(S,H) = 0.151, which is 
not significantly different from zero, while r(T,H) = 0.417 
which is significantly above zero. 
13. Walter Ndllahon, "A Broader Neasure and Neal th and Effort 
for Educational Equity and Tax Equity," Journal of Education 
Finance 4 (Summer 1978) g65-88. 
14. "Holding community-size constant" really means "within 
a given size-bracket." Although size still varies among 
communities within a given size-bracket, this variability is 
severely restricted. and thus much less likely to confound 
behavioral relationships '1.-li th V'Teal th. 
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and the Vermont Data Bank; concludes with a plea to publish so that 
Vermonters might become more conscious of their heritage. 
Data Collection: Individ~~l Rights to Privacy Versus Public Program 
Needs, edited by D. Gregory Sanford, Hary B. Deming, and Frederick 
E. Schmidt , 55 pp ., 1977. Summarizes addresses and remarks delivered 
at a November 6, 1976 conference sponsored by the Center and funded 
in part by a grant · from the Vermont Council on the Humanities and 
Public Issues, and the UVM College of Arts and Sciences. 
Vermont's Heritage: A Wo~!dng Confere~_ce fo_£ Teachers--Plans, Proposals, 
and Needs, edited by Marshall True, Mary Woodruff, and Kristin 
Peterson-Ishaq, 127 pp., 1983. Incorporates scholars' presentations 
and curricular projects developed by participants at a July 8-10, 1983 
conference partially supported by a matching grant from the Vermont 
Council on the Humanities and Public Issues. 
"University of Vennont Graduate r.oJ lege Theses on Vennont Topics in Arts 
and Scienc:es, 11 30 pp., 1982, supplement to _Occasronal P<1_per No. One ; 
provides abstracts of theses on Vent~nL L ov i rs in arts anrl s-:-:-:t~ .. ~ 
completed between Spring 1978 and Fall 1982. 

